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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of contracting out on the costs incurred by local authorities
in providing refuse collection services. Using original survey data for the Republic of Ireland, three
methods of estimating the impact of tendering are adopted. Crude comparisons of costs before and
after tendering and the costs of local authorities versus private contractors indicate that tendering
can yield savings of between 34 and 45 per cent. Using multivariate regression analysis to enable
us to control for service characteristics confirms cost savings of around 45 per cent. The bulk of
these cost savings are attributed to real efficiency gains as a result of contracting out.
I  INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, governments throughout the world have searchedfor a new approach to public sector management. The traditional arms of
public administration have been subjected to a variety of measures of reform in
an attempt to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery.
These include the privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation of markets
and the marketisation of public services such as health, education and community
care. In local government there has been a discernible shift towards the
promotion of competition (through the use of competitive tendering) to provide
services traditionally provided directly by the local authorities. Since 1988 local
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authorities in England, Scotland, and Wales have been compelled to put certain
defined activities (such as refuse collection and cleaning of buildings) out to
public tender. There has been a resultant upsurge in the extent of contracting
out of services to the private sector. A more pragmatic approach has been adopted
in countries such as Holland (Snape, 1994), Sweden (Walsh et al., 1997) and
Australia (Domberger and Hall, 1996) where local authorities have been
encouraged rather than compelled to make use of competitive tendering and
contracting as a means of organising service delivery.
There is international evidence to suggest that the use of competitive tendering
can yield considerable cost savings (see Domberger and Jensen, 1997, for a review
of evidence). The potential for cost savings however, varies across services and
efficiency gains can be reduced by the costs of contracting. There is also the
possibility that cost savings are accrued through a deterioration in working
conditions rather than genuine efficiency gains (Milne and Michie, 1997).
Local authorities in Ireland have for long made extensive use of external
sources for service provision. Some examples include major capital projects such
as roads, housing and water/sewerage. Another service that has been increasingly
privatised or contracted out in recent years is refuse collection (Reeves, 1995,
Coughlan and de Buitleir, 1996). However, despite accounting for the highest
cost element of solid waste management, refuse collection generally attracts
less attention than final disposal (Barrett and Lawlor, 1995, p. 33). This paper
aims to address the evident need for information on the cost of providing refuse
collection services in Ireland. In particular, the paper focuses on the cost-effects
of privatising refuse collection services by contracting out, following the use of
competitive tendering. The analysis presented, is part of a wider study of the
experience of local authorities with contracting out the service. On the basis of
original survey data it examines whether the use of private contractors has led
to significant cost reductions and the degree to which any reductions represent
genuine efficiency gains.
II  EXTENT AND FORMS OF PRIVATISATION OF REFUSE
COLLECTION SERVICES IN IRELAND
The first stage of the research presented in this paper involved the determin-
ation of the different arrangements for providing refuse collection services in
Ireland. A brief questionnaire-based survey, covering each of the 88 local
authorities was conducted. The brevity of the questionnaire combined with follow-
up telephone calls ensured a 100 per cent response rate. The survey revealed
that three basic arrangements for providing refuse collection services were
adopted by Irish local authorities in 1995 (see Table 1). The majority (61 per
cent) of local authorities provided refuse collection services in their areas through
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their own direct labour (public provision).1 In almost 15 per cent of cases, private
service providers were contracted to provide refuse collection services by local
authorities following a competitive tendering process. Under this arrangement,
private contractors provided the service in accordance with the terms of an agreed
contract and there was no financial arrangement between the private collector
and customers. In the remaining 24 per cent of cases, local authorities fully
privatised the provision and finance of refuse collection services. In such
circumstances, the consumer selects and pays the private producer for the service.
Table 1: Refuse Collection Arrangements in Irish Local Authorities 1995
Arrangement Co. Borough County Borough Urban Total
Corporations Councils Corporations District
Councils
Public 5 12 5 32 54
Contract Out 0 3 0 10 13
Full Privatisation 0 14 0 7 21
Total 5 29 5 49 88
Note: Two County Councils (CCs) and two Urban District Councils (UDCs) contract out
between 45-70 per cent of their local authority areas. All other contracting authorities
contract out 100 per cent.
As local authorities that fully privatise their services no longer incur expendi-
tures, the examination of the impact of privatisation on refuse collection costs
conducted in this paper is confined to an analysis of the impact of contracting
out after competitive tendering.
III  COMPETITIVE TENDERING — THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Domberger (1986) summarises the nature of franchising. The best known
method is the Chadwick/Demsetz auction, which according to Demsetz (1968)
provides an appealing alternative to regulation and state monopoly. By putting
the right to be a monopoly provider of a service up to auction and awarding that
right to the bidder offering the lowest consumer price, competition for the market
replaces competition in the market. Variants of the Chadwick/Demsetz auction
include: awarding the contract to the bidder offering the most attractive price/
quality combination; or to the bidder who offers to pay the most for it; or to the
bidder willing to receive the lowest contract price (i.e. contracting out). The
1. It is noteworthy that retaining public provision does not necessarily coincide with public
finance of the service.  A number of local authorities that retain public provision levy user-charges
on end users.
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attraction of this model was stressed by Demsetz who argued that ex post
monopoly in the supply of goods and services is now consistent with ex ante
competition for the right to be the sole supplier for a given period of time.
Morgan (1992) distinguishes between franchising and contracting out. Under
a franchise agreement “the user pays the provider directly for the service and
the public authority may or may not control prices or service levels” (Morgan,
1992, p. 254). Furthermore, the franchise may be exclusive or non-exclusive.
Under contracting out, the public authority retains ownership but awards a
competitive bid to a private vendor for operation and maintenance.
The advantages and limitations of the contracting-out model were formally
described by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987). Using a principal-agent framework,
these writers devised a “privatisation theorem” which set out conditions under
which government objectives can be attained by an appropriately designed
auction of the rights to produce a given product or service.
Given government objectives of productive efficiency, allocative efficiency and
rent extraction, the ideal setting is that two or more risk-neutral firms bid for
the right to produce the good/service. Actual costs are only learned by the
successful bidder just prior to production. Bidders do not collude and have
symmetric beliefs about the state of technology. They bid for the right to receive
payment according to the government’s valuation of output. According to
Sappington and Stiglitz the firm submitting the highest bid is chosen. It will
select the production level most desired by the government, conditional on actual
costs being realised. As bidding firms shared symmetric beliefs about costs, the
competitive tendering process ensures that no rents accrue to the winner.
The conditions are however strict and the ideal setting may not be attained.
This can lead to “privatisation failure”, which according to the writers can arise
for a number of reasons. For example, the government may fail to extract rents
due to collusion between bidders at the bidding stage or because information
problems mean the government lacks precise information of its social valuation
function. Despite the real potential for “privatisation failure” Sappington and
Stiglitz (1987) contend that the ideal setting is conceivably attainable where:
(a) product specification is simple;
(b) technology is well known;
(c) significant demand fluctuations are unlikely within the terms of the
arrangement;
(d) the incumbent or any bidder does not possess advantageous information;
(e) entry costs are not high and transfer of the firm’s assets to the private
producer is not difficult.
As refuse collection generally satisfies these conditions it is commonly con-
tracted out to the private sector. Furthermore, as the service is a relatively simple
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service to analyse, a number of published studies have examined the impact of
privatising refuse collection services on service costs. Some earlier (late 1970s,
1980s) analyses of the privatisation of refuse collection services in the USA
were summarised by Savas (1987, p. 128). Nine major studies over a ten year
period were reviewed and Savas concluded that municipal collection was roughly
35 per cent more costly than contract collection although a range of 14 to 124
per cent was reported.2
Walsh (1991) and Walsh and Davis (1993) conducted comprehensive studies
of the impact of the Local Government Act 1988 and compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT) in the UK. The first study involved following the experiences
of a panel of 40 local authorities over the initial stages of introducing competition
across all services covered by the Act. Two approaches were taken to estimating
the financial impact of contracting out refuse collection services. First, local
authorities were asked to compare the costs of providing the service with
estimated costs in the first full year after contracting out. On the basis of data
returned by seven authorities, average cost savings were estimated at 8 per
cent of pre-competition costs. In order to deal with some of the limitations of
this initial approach (e.g. the non-inclusion of costs such as redundancy payments
or income from the sale of equipment) local authorities were asked to estimate
cost savings/losses by taking all continuing additional costs and revenues into
account. The average result for refuse collection was cost savings of 12.4 per
cent. The second study of the experiences of local authorities under CCT was
published in 1993. The authors remarked that it “proved increasingly difficult
to gather financial information through questionnaires” (Walsh and Davis, 1993,
p. 141). Information was therefore supplemented by interviews with the best
result often only an estimate of costs. Refuse collection was found to be one of
the three services in which the greatest savings were found. On the basis of
22 observations, cost savings over the first three years of competition were
estimated at 11.3 per cent.
More sophisticated methods of estimating cost savings have been adopted
McDavid (1985), Domberger et al. (1986), Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) and
Bello and Szymanski (1996). In a sample of 205 Canadian cities, McDavid (1985)
reported that exclusive public collection was 50.9 per cent more expensive than
private collection. In order to control for factors such as environmental dif-
ferences, regression analysis was used to predict costs per household. It was
reported that public collection was 41 per cent more expensive than private
collection. These savings were attributed to improved technical efficiency,
somewhat lower pay, better incentives and use of larger trucks. Domberger
2. It should be noted that Savas expresses cost savings as a percentage of the lower private costs
which inflate the savings relative to those in other studies.
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et al. (1986) conducted the most thorough analysis of contracting out before the
introduction of CCT in the UK. Using data for England and Wales, from an
annual survey conducted by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy (CIPFA), they estimated the cost of waste collection services using
16 variables. After controlling for factors such as economies of scale and regional
variation they found that costs incurred by private contractors were on average
22 per cent less than costs of public collectors. Successful in-house contractors
were on average 17 per cent less costly. These findings were supported by Data-
Envelopment Analysis conducted by Cubbin et al. (1987) and by time-series/
cross section analysis by Szymanski and Wilkins (1993).
Bello and Szymanski (1996) published the first detailed analysis of contracting
under CCT. They found that refuse collection costs fell by 22 per cent on average,
comparing the last full year before introducing competitive tendering with the
first full year afterwards. After controlling for variations in service characteristics
they found that the size of cost savings directly attributable to the competitive
tender was between 27 and 34 per cent.
Overall there is strong evidence to support the case for contracting out as a
means of reducing service expenditure. Controversy remains however with
regard to the source of these cost reductions. Whereas Cubbin et al. (1987) found
that the cost savings estimated by Domberger et al. (1986) were attributable to
“improvements in physical productivity of men and vehicles” (Cubbin et al.,
1987, p. 53) these were disputed by Ganley and Grahl (1988). The latter
questioned some of the assumptions underpinning the original study and argued
that the savings were more attributable to reductions in quality, large scale
redundancies and deterioration in working conditions. What most studies do
demonstrate, however, is the significance of service characteristics as
determinants of costs. In particular, one of the key determinants of cost is the
point from which household refuse is collected. Bello and Szymanski (1996) cite
previous studies that show authorities can reduce costs by 25 per cent if they
change their method of collection from backdoor to kerbside collection. However,
in their own study the same authors found that there was no evidence that CCT
brought about any radical shift in characteristics of the specification of the
services delivered to consumers. Hence the bulk of cost savings are attributed
to competition.
IV  ORGANISATION OF REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES IN
IRELAND AND DATA ASSEMBLY
The Waste Management Act 1996 provides the current legal framework for
governance of the waste management sector in Ireland. The Act restates the
traditional responsibility of major local authorities for waste management in
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relation to non-hazardous wastes and for ensuring adequate domestic waste
collection and disposal arrangements in their areas. Authorities must decide on
the level of service and whether the service is provided by the public or private
sector.3 Aspects of the service to be decided include: frequency and method of
collection, type of container and the provision of recycling facilities and collection
of non-standard items. As the provisions of the Act have only recently been
implemented this study focuses on the impact of contracting out on local authority
expenditures prior to 1996.
To gather data on the costs and other characteristics of the refuse collection
two complementary approaches were adopted. First, as part of a wider pro-
gramme of research, structured interviews were conducted with contracting
authorities.4 These interviews covered most aspects of the contracting experience
of relevant authorities including a comparison of costs before and after con-
tracting.
Second, a single questionnaire was sent to all local authorities (excluding
those who had fully privatised their service as these councils no longer incur
any expenditures). As local authorities are generally prepared to respond to a
limited range of questions a three-page questionnaire was designed asking twelve
questions. Responses to 51 of the 74 questionnaires were received – a response
rate of 68.9 per cent.5 The questionnaire covered the years 1993, 1994 and 1995
and details concerning the following issues were requested:
• Costs: Each authority was requested to provide the gross cost of providing
refuse collection services in their area for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995;
• Quantity: As the cost data provided can cover “domestic” or “domestic and
commercial” collection, respondents were requested to provide information
on the number of households and the number of premises from which refuse
is collected. Respondents were also requested to provide details regarding
3. The Act recognises that waste collection services are increasingly being provided by commercial
concerns.  In order to ensure that these operations are carried out in an environmentally sound
manner, it provides that commercial collectors of waste will require a permit from the relevant local
authority.  Waste collection of both hazardous and non-hazardous waste will be subject to the granting
of permits from the local authority, provided the persons involved fulfil certain regulatory and fiscal
requirements.  The Waste Management Act 1996 therefore provides the legal framework for
governance of the Waste Management sector in Ireland including the regulation of privatised refuse
collection services.
4. Seven of the 13 authorities that were contracting out during our survey period (1993-1995)
provided cost data during structured interviews.
5. As Cork County Council is divided into North, West and South for administrative purposes,
they were treated as separate local authorities in this survey.  Hence the initial total number of
local authorities was 90.  This survey was undertaken as part of a wider programme of research.
An earlier phase of the research identified that 16 local authorities had fully privatised arrangements
for refuse collection services in each of the three years 1993-95 and consequently did not incur any
service expenditures.  The total number of questionnaires sent was therefore 74.
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the number of wheel bins issued by the local authority. This question served
a number of purposes. First, it served as a proxy for the number of units
collected from. Second, as the wheel bin method is generally accepted as
providing a better level of service than traditional bins, the data assisted
in controlling for service quality. Third, because the costs figures provided
may include the costs of introducing the wheel bin method, the question
served to reveal if this occurred over the three years covered;
• Service Characteristics: Authorities were requested to provide various
indicators of service quality. These included:
(a) collection frequency;
(b) the percentage of gross expenditure paid to private collectors;
(c) the percentage of gross expenditure paid to provide recycling facilities;
(d) the percentage of waste collected kerbside, backdoor and by any other
method of collection.
V  DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We first examine how costs have changed before and after contracting in a
number of authorities. This serves as a useful preliminary analysis as costs can
be expected to be fairly stable before and after contracting out (Boyne, 1997).
Contracting authorities that agreed to be interviewed, were asked to provide
the costs of providing refuse collection services in the full year before contracting
with the contract costs in the first full year of contracting. The results for the
seven respondents are displayed in Table 2. Contract costs include transaction
costs incurred in the introduction of contracting. On the basis of the five cases
where contracting did not coincide with the introduction of the wheel bin method,
average cost savings amounted to 33.5 per cent.6
We also demonstrate the crude difference in costs between contracting and
non-contracting authorities without accounting for explanatory factors such as
size of authority. Table 3 provides unit7 costs and standard deviations for
contracting and non-contracting local authorities for the years 1993, 1994 and
1995. Comparing the average cost per unit for contracting and non-contracting
authorities reveals that costs were lower for contracting authorities by 49.0 per
cent in 1993, 46.5 per cent in 1994 and 43.4 per cent in 1995.8
6. In the cases of Authority 1 and Authority 4, contracting coincided with the introduction of the
wheel bin method of collection.
7. Unit cost is used instead of household cost as 43 per cent of respondents failed to separate the
costs of domestic and commercial refuse collection.
8. While this approach fails to control for authority-specific factors besides the number of units,
it should be noted that the following section supports the findings of previous studies which show
that much of the variation in total cost can be explained by the size of the service.
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Table 2: Gross Cost Savings (Comparing Pre-Contract Cost with Contract Price)
Authority Year Costs Costs Saving/
Before CT Year Before Year After Loss (%)
Authority 1 (UDC) 1993 205,920 264,000 –28.21
Authority 2 (CC) 1987 436,400 246,400 43.54
Authority 3 (CC) 1987 75,000 66,000 12.00
Authority 4 (UDC) 1992 42,489 33,150 21.98
Authority 5 (UDC) 1986 22,424 14,300 36.23
Authority 6 (CC) 1984 83,000 55,000 33.73
Authority 7 (UDC) 1992 58,130 33,648 42.12
Notes: (1) In the case of Authority 1 post-contracting costs were higher as they included
the purchase of wheel bins.
(2) In the case of Authority 2 the data refers to the privatisation of some of the
routes served by the council.
(3  In the case of Authority 4, contracting commenced in 1986. The costs compared
here are the costs of two different contractors.
(4) CC = County Council, UDC = Urban District Council.
The statistical significance of the difference between the sample variances
and means were also tested. The tests revealed that the variance was signifi-
cantly lower for contracting authorities in years 1993 and 1994.9 Sample means
were significantly lower for contracting authorities in all years.10 A full set of
statistical outputs is available on request from the authors.
Table 3: Average Cost Per Unit, Standard Deviation and Coefficient of
Variation for Sample Non-Contracting and Contracting Local Authorities
1993 1994 1995
Non-Contracting Local Authorities (n=36) (n=37) (n=37)
Average Unit Cost £54.72 £55.77 £55.93
Standard Deviation £37.96 £34.89 £34.33
Coefficient of Variation 0.69 0.63 0.61
Contracting Local Authorities (n=12) (n=11) (n=11)
Average Unit Cost £28.07 £29.79 £31.64
Standard Deviation £13.22 £15.05 £23.64
Coefficient of Variation 0.47 0.50 0.74
  9. The difference between variances for 1995 is statistically significant if the outlier in the
contracting authorities is not included.
10. The difference in means is statistically significant at 5 and 1 per cent for each year except
1995 when the hypothesis that the means were equal cannot be rejected at 1 per cent.
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Overall, these comparisons point to significantly lower costs for contracting
authorities. Furthermore, because sample variances are significantly lower for
contracting authorities this could be interpreted as indicating greater attention
to cost savings across the contracting sample.11
Multivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis — Theory and Data
The most comprehensive approach to examining the impact of contracting
out on local authority costs involves the estimation of the relevant cost function
using regression analysis. Most of the previous studies conducting this form of
analysis adopt the model proposed by Stevens (1978) which is based on the
assumption that the production function for refuse collection can be represented
by Cobb-Douglas technology such that output (Q) is a function of drivers and
loaders (L), trucks (K) and authority-specific characteristics (A).
Authorities are assumed to minimise costs subject to their production function
and under this assumption the following log-linear cost function can be
estimated.
ln (Ci) = ΣγAi + ao + a1 ln (Qi) + ui (1)
where Ci is the cost of refuse collection, Ai is a vector of authority specific service
characteristics, ao is a constant term, and Qi is a measure of output in the
service. The value assumed by a1 is an indicator of the presence of economies of
scale and ui is a disturbance term.
The precise description of the model estimated is as follows:
Ln C = α + β1 Ln Unit + β2 Ln Den + β3 Con + β4 Wheel + β5 Intwheel
 + β6 More + β7 Less + β8 Recyc + U (2)
Note: These variables are described in Table 4.
This description was decided on the basis of previous empirical studies, the
data provided by the survey and advice from persons responsible for refuse
collection in some local authorities. Hence, the model did not include some of
the variables used in studies conducted in the UK. For example, although input
prices should theoretically be included they are unlikely to vary much in the
cross section. This would not permit estimation of the equation. Another
noteworthy exclusion in the model is “method of collection” which previous
11. As the difference in sample variances is related to the difference in sample means, Table 3
also provides the coefficient of variation for both samples.  This weights the sample standard
deviations by the sample means.  The summary statistics indicate a large difference in coefficient of
variation for 1993 and 1994.  The coefficient of variation for the contracting sample is 0.30 in 1995
(50 per cent lower than the coefficient for non-contracting authorities) when the outlier is omitted.
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studies found was a significant determinant of costs. Although the survey
questionnaire included questions based on the method of collection the responses
received showed little variation with an overwhelming majority of authorities
indicating that 100 per cent of waste was collected kerbside. Method of collection
was, therefore, not included as an explanatory variable.
Table 4: Description of Variables
Variables Description Log/Level
C Total gross expenditure on refuse collection services including: Log
employees, premises, transport, materials, supply of bins,
apportionment of central administration costs.
Unit Number of domestic and commercial units. Log
Den Density of units per hectare Log
More Percentage of units collected from more than once a week. Level
Less Percentage of units collected from less than once a week. Level
Con Dummy Variable = 1 if privately contracted more than 10%;
0 if otherwise. Level
Wheel Dummy Variable = 1 if wheel bin method of collection used;
0 if otherwise. Level
Intwhl Dummy Variable = 1 if wheel bin method of collection introduced;
0 if otherwise Level
Recyc Percentage of total costs expended on recycling Level
As the cost amounts provided by local authorities covered domestic collection
in some cases and domestic and commercial collection in others, output is
measured as the number of units that the relevant cost figure refers to.
Authority-specific factors specified in the model include density of the
collection area and frequency of collection. The model also includes a variable
covering the provision of recycling activities. Both Domberger et al. (1986) and
Bello and Szymanski (1996) included three variables12 accounting for waste
reclamation activities in their models. Government policy on recycling in Ireland
was outlined in its strategy document Recycling for Ireland in 1994. This reflected
the requirements of the EU packaging directive which sets targets for the
recovery and recycling of packaging waste. The target rates are 25 per cent for
most material types and 55 per cent for glass for over five years. The role of
local authorities in providing a recycling dimension to refuse collection is low.
12. The three variables were: tonnes of paper collected, number of abandoned cars collected and
number of bottle banks operated by the authority.
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According to Barrett and Lawlor (1995) there are two main approaches to
recycling - “bring” and “collect’. With the “bring” system, recyclables are brought
by the waste generator to a point of collection e.g. a bottlebank. The main system
is the glass bottlebank system organised by the voluntary organisation REHAB.
Local authority involvement is confined to assistance in preparation of the
bottlebank sites and payment of a lump sum subsidy to REHAB. The “collect”
system involves the recycler collecting from the waste generator’s premises and
bringing the recyclables to the Materials Recovery Facility. According to Barrett
and Lawlor (1995) the only example of a “collect” system is a private enterprise
based in Dublin. As recycling activity by Irish local authorities over the period
1993-95 appears to have been appreciably low, the specified model includes just
a single recycling variable measured in terms of the percentage of costs accounted
for by the provision of recycling facilities.
The single most significant aspect of the organisation of refuse collection
services since the mid-1990s has been the introduction of the wheel bin service.
The introduction of wheel bins can generally lead to reduction in crew size and
increases in the number of houses that can be serviced in the same time-span.
On this basis the model includes a dummy variable accounting for the use of the
wheel bin method of collection with the relationship between this factor and
cost expected to be negative.
Estimation
The regression defined by Equation (1) was estimated by adopting two main
approaches.
(1) Cross-Sections by Year: Individual cross sections for each year in the data
set were estimated in order to establish the relative level of costs for local
authorities. Although the composition of authorities changed from year
to year the number of observations per year was 48. In addition, the entire
data set was combined with the cost amounts deflated using the consumer
price index (CPI). This simply involved stacking the three cross sections
and estimating the cost function using the combined data.
(2) Panel Data Model: According to Gujarati (1995) combining time series
and cross-sectional data is common in situations where there are a limited
number of observations. Combining the data may provide more efficient
estimation, and inference13 but if the original model is estimated using
ordinary least squares after simply stacking the cross-sections this
implicitly assumes both temporal stability (i.e. the regression parameters
do not change over time) and cross-sectional stability (i.e. the regression
13. According to Vinod and Ullah quoted in Gujarati (1995, p.524).
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parameters do not differ between cross-sectional units). These assump-
tions are relaxed and the regressions are re-estimated using panel data
modelling. Due to a technical problem this gave inappropriate results as
we explain below.
Some of the authorities provided data for one or two of the years covered so
the sample was restricted to 48 observations for each of the cross-sections and
144 for the combined data.
Interpreting the Coefficients
(1)  Cross-Sections: The coefficients in the basic cost equation estimated for
three separate years; 1993-95 are shown in Table 5. Most are of the expected
size and are statistically significant. The adjusted R2 for the three years is 0.817
for 1993, 0.865 for 1994, and 0.868 for 1995. These indicate that most of the
variation in costs between authorities is determined by factors included in the
specified equation. It is notable that most coefficients are very stable across the
three years.
Domberger et al. (1986) report that most of the variation in total cost can be
explained by differences in the size of the refuse collection service. If number of
units is included as the only explanatory variable in this study, the estimated
R2 is 0.729 for 1993, 0.818 for 1994 and 0.817 for 1995. The estimated coefficients
for “number of units” in the specified cost function can be interpreted as elasticity
values and the estimates are similar over the three years. The results strongly
suggest a unit elasticity without evidence of economies of scale (similar to
Domberger et al. (1986) but unlike Szymanski and Wilkins (1993)).14 The
“number of units per hectare” (density) was statistically significant and stable
across the three years.
The coefficient on the dummy variable for private contracting is significant
in each of the years examined. The results indicate that the introduction of
private contracting yields substantial cost savings. These amounted to 41 per
cent in 1993, 48 per cent in 1994 and 47 per cent in 1995.15
14. Given the absence of economies of scale the model was re-estimated with the cost per unit as
the dependent variable and the number of units omitted.  The results for the combined regression
are not markedly different from the results from the original model.
15. Note on interpretation:  The estimated coefficient is interpreted as private contractors costs
as a proportion of other authorities costs, given by eβ.  So for 1993, b = –0.537.  Contractor’s costs =
e–0.537 = 0.59, indicating a 41 per cent cost saving.
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Table 5: Summary of Regression Results – Cross-Sections by Year and Stacked
1993 1994 1995 Stacked
Variable Description Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
(T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) (T-Ratio)
Constant 3.800 3.636 3.458 3.530
(5.440) (6.002) (5.862) (10.465)
Lnunt Number of units 0.978 1.024 1.032 1.024
(11.607) (14.229) (15.192) (25.728)
Lnden Density of units –0.1214 –0.140 –0.102 –0.116
(–3.105) (–3.445) (–2.663) (–5.406)
Con Privately Contracted –0.537 –0.661 –0.633 –0.585
(–2.687) (–3.320) (–3.153) (–5.412)
Wheel Wheel-bin method used 0.695 0.391 0.379 0.452
(3.312) (2.114) (2.210) (4.501)
Intwhl Wheel-bin introduced –0.124 –0.378 0.129 –0.118
(–0.370) (–1.471) (0.480) (–0.786)
More More than once a week 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.055) (0.500) (0.433) (–1.085)
Less Less than once a week –0.005 –0.003 0.009 –0.004
(–0.950) (–0.286) (0.755) (–0.891)
Recyc Percentage of expenditure 0.430 –0.025 –0.027 –0.019
on Recycling (1.341) (–0.228) (–0.676) (–0.536)
Adj R2 0.817 0.865 0.868 0.862
n = 48 n = 48 n = 48 n=144
Notes: (1) Statistically significant results in bold.
(2) Ramsey’s RESET test for functional form (square of fitted values):
1993: F = 0.11481; 1994: F = 0.19078; 1995: F = 0.86661; Pool: F = 0.0001
F1, 38 (5%) = 4.08, F1, 38 (1%) = 7.31; F1, 134 (5%) = 43.92, F1, 134 (1%) = 6.85.
(3) Heteroscedasticity (regression of squared residuals on square of fitted
values):
1993: F = 1.3000; 1994: F = 0.86726; 1995: F = 0.4492; Pool: F = 0.0078
F1, 46 (5%) = 4.08, F1, 46 (1%) = 7.31, F1, 134 (5%) = 43.92, F1, 134 (1%) = 6.85.
Table 6: Comparison of Cost Savings Under Bivariate Cross-Sectionaal
and Regression Analysis
 Year Bivariate C-S Regression
1993 49.0 41.0
1994 46.5 48.0
1995 43.4 47.0
Average Average
1993-95 46.4 45.3
CONTRACTING OUT REFUSE COLLECTION SERVICES 143
Table 6 shows how the estimated savings are large and broadly similar to
savings calculated earlier (see Table 3).16 This suggests that contracting and
non-contracting authorities are not too dissimilar in their characteristics.
Moreover the degree of savings is similar to the findings of McDavid (1985) who
estimated savings of 41 per cent in a Canadian-based study. However, the
magnitude of these savings is notably higher than those estimated in comparable
UK studies where savings were consistently estimated at around 20 per cent.17
Although frontier efficiency models offer means of examining the efficiency
of contracting and non-contracting authorities, these are not adopted because
there are relatively few observations in the cross-section. Accurate measurement
of any deviations from symmetry of residuals is therefore difficult. Instead the
question of efficiency is examined by comparing the residuals of the regression
equation, estimated with the dummy variable related to competitive tendering
omitted, for both categories of authority. The residuals measure how much higher
or lower actual costs are, compared to the predictions of the cost function.
Authorities with efficiency measures below zero are more efficient and vice versa.
Between 77 and 85 per cent of contracting authorities have actual costs below
the level predicted by the specified function over the three years examined,
compared to between 26 and 31 per cent of non-contracting authorities. This
indicates that the incidence of efficiency is much higher amongst contracting
authorities (see Figures 1-2 for 1994 data). It is worth noting, however, that the
best of the non-contracting authorities perform as well as the best contracting
ones. However, the long tail of poor performers in the non-contracting sub-sample
differentiates the two groups. This pattern of results is similar to those found
by Domberger et al. (1986) in their analysis of contracting out of refuse collection
service in the UK sample. In addition, Figure 3 shows that the dispersion of
residuals is smaller for contracting authorities thereby indicating greater
attention to efficiency across the contracting sub-sample.
16. It is anecdotally acknowledged that work practices in the bigger Borough Corporations can
give rise to inefficiencies in these authorities.  In order to examine this issue the original regressions
were re-run with these bigger authorities omitted.  However, no marked change was found in the
coefficient on contracting which is the key independent variable.
17. The estimated savings were:
Domberger et al. (1986): 22 per cent 1983-85 (pooled regression, contracting voluntary);
Szymanski and Wilkins (1993): 20 per cent (descriptive cross-sections by year), around 20 per cent
1984-86 (regression, cross-section by year, contracting voluntary); 21 per cent 1984-88 (pooled
regression, contracting voluntary).
Bello and Szymanski (1996): 19 per cent, 1984-88, (pooled regression, contracting voluntary), between
27 per cent and 34 per cent for post-CCT years using 1984-93 data (pooled regression, contracting
voluntary and compulsory).
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Figure 1: Residuals for Contracting Authorities 1994
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Figure 2:  Residuals for Non Contracting Authorities 1994
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Figure 3:  Residuals for Contracting and Non Contracting Authorities 1994
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The coefficient on the variable for use of the wheel bin method indicates that
this method of collection is more expensive. Given the perceived advantages of
the wheel bin method the estimates appear to be counter-intuitive. The result
may be explained by the phasing-in of the wheel bin system in a number of
authorities18 during the years covered by the study. If the amortisation of the
related investment is included in the costs figures provided this would increase
costs in the short term.
The remaining explanatory variables (the independent variables to capture
any effect on costs in that year caused by the introduction of the wheel bin
method,19 percentage of units collected more and less than once per week and
percentage of expenditure incurred for provision of recycling facilities) were not
statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent levels.
The regression parameters estimated by stacking the individual cross-sections
are also shown in Table 5. These are similar to those in the individual cross-
sections in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. This confirms the
temporal stability apparent in the separate cross-sections for the three years.
(2) Panel Data Modelling: In order to examine the issue of differences between
cross-sections which are implicitly assumed away in the stacked regression,
further regressions were run based on panel data modelling. Initially, group dummy
variables were included to capture intrinsic differences between authorities.
The results from this (fixed effects) regression are reported in Appendix 1.20
The tests do indicate differences between authorities but most variables are
statistically insignificant. This is not unexpected because some of the variables
are time invariant.21 A generalised least squares regression (random effects
model) was subsequently employed and the results from this regression are
presented in Appendix 2. Both the fixed and random effects models estimated
the coefficient for the contracting variable as positive. This result is counter-
intuitive and is explained by the single council in the sample that moved from
public provision to contracting out during the period examined. In this case
service costs increased resulting in a positive coefficient. Therefore, the regression
results from the original cross-sections are preferred.
18. The wheel bin method was introduced by 16 authorities over the period 1993-95.
19. The variables Wheel and Intwhl were tested for possible correlation.  The impact of omitting
the variables, on the R2 was also tested.  These tests indicated that the explanatory power of the
model was not compromised by inclusion of the variables.
20. The regression results shown in Appendix 1 were estimated using a so-called within estimator
which treats the Ui as fixed — that is, it estimates a separate intercept for every firm.  This can be
done by suppressing the constant term and adding a dummy variable for each N firms or, equivalently,
by keeping the constant term and adding (N – 1) dummies (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984, p. 369).
21. This is discussed in Schmidt and Sickles (1984, p. 369).
146 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Overall, this cost function analysis shows that Irish local authorities have
accrued substantial cost savings by contracting out refuse collection services.
One question that naturally arises, however, is whether these savings represent
genuine gains in productivity or efficiency? This issue has been addressed in a
number of studies of the contracting experience in the UK and some writers
(e.g. Ganley and Grahl (1988), Jackson (1994), Milne (1997)) have questioned
the overall welfare effects of contracting out, given the (mainly case-based)
evidence of reductions in wages, longer working hours and poorer conditions.
The evidence gathered from structured interviews with Irish local authorities
for this study indicates that savings were derived from a number of sources. In
all contracting authorities examined, interviewees suggested that lower costs
incurred by private contractors were partly attributable to more flexible work
practices (e.g. smaller crew sizes). While these do represent real productivity
gains, some cases reported the existence of poorer working conditions in the
private sector (e.g. lower health and safety standards and the employment of
underage labour). The latter sources of cost savings have obvious redistributive
consequences and reduce the extent to which measured cost savings improve
overall economic welfare.
It is important to note that cost savings arising from contracting refuse collec-
tion services did not necessarily lead to a reduction in overall local government
expenditure. In most cases, contracting authorities re-deployed all the relevant
direct labour following contracting.22 For example, when one Urban District
Council contracted out its service in 1994, it re-deployed all 10 members of its
refuse collection crews. In the late 1980s, trade union opposition to partial
privatisation led to one County Council creating four new positions within the
local authority. The bulk of cost savings on the refuse collection service were
therefore retained within local authorities rather than contributing to a reduction
in overall local authority expenditure. However, assuming that labour has a
positive marginal product after re-deployment the efficiency gains recorded above
are real.
VI  DISCUSSION
This paper presents the first analysis of the impact of privatising the provision
of refuse collection services on costs in Ireland through competitive tendering.
The study focuses entirely on local authorities that have privatised by contracting
out service provision and is therefore comparable with a number of similar
studies from other countries.
22. Six of the 9 authorities, interviewed as part of a wider programme of research, revealed that
trade union opposition to privatisation resulted in the re-deployment of the entire refuse collection
crews within the authorities.
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Three separate approaches to estimating the impact on costs were adopted.
(a) A basic comparison of the costs for contracting councils in years before
and after contracting indicated that average cost savings of 33.5 per cent
were accrued by contracting authorities and that these savings varied
from 12 per cent to 44 per cent.
(b) The second method compared the average unit cost of contracting
authorities versus authorities still engaged in public provision of the
service. The comparisons were made for the three years 1993-95 and
statistically significant differences were found for all three years.
Contracting authorities were found to have lower costs of around 46 per
cent on average.
(c) Multivariate statistical analysis enabling control of relevant service
characteristics also revealed significant savings for contracting authorities
in the region of 45 per cent on average. Furthermore, it was found that
the incidence of efficiency was much greater amongst authorities that
contracted out the service.
These results provide evidence of the cost savings that can be accrued by
local authorities contracting out their refuse collection services through
competitive tendering. The estimated cost savings are more than double the
savings estimated in similar studies in the UK. Although the survey data used
in the latter two methods do not permit analysis of the sources of these savings,
structured interviews with contracting authorities indicate that contractors
provide a cheaper service due to more flexible work practices. In some cases
however, these gains are offset by the existence of poorer working conditions.
Overall efficiency gains are more probable in cases where there is strong
competition for the contract and the evaluation of tenders is rigorous without
an over-emphasis on contract price.
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APPENDIX 1
Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables: Results
Ordinary least squares regression. Dep. Variable = LNCOST
Observations = 144 Weights= ONE
Mean of LHS = 0.1181431E+02 Std.Dev of LHS = 0.1363607E+01
Std Dev of residuals = 0.8234416E-01 Sum of squares =0.5763477E+00
R-squared = 0.9978324E+00 Adjusted R-squared = 0.9963534E+00
F[ 58, 85] = 0.6746499E+03 Prob value 0.2036704E-93
Log-likelihood = 0.1931746E+03 Restr.(á=0) Log-l = –0.2484846E+03
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= –0.1863536E+01 Akaike Info. Crit. = 0.9558708E-02
ANOVA Source Variation Degrees of Freedom Mean Square
Regression 0.2653213E+03 58 0.4574505E+01
Residual 0.5763477E+00 85 0.6780561E-02
Total 0.2658977E+03 143 0.1859424E+01
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Prob|t|òx Mean Std. Dev.
of X of X
LNUNIT 1.8738 1.373 1.365 0.17465 8.1056 1.1407
LNDENS –1.9239 1.370 –1.404 0.16257 –0.22659E-01 2.3536
CON 0.32227 0.1074 3.002 0.00319 0.27083 0.44594
WHEEL –0.98105E-02 0.4538E-01 –0.216 0.82918 0.32639 0.47053
INTWHL 0.69820E-01 0.3916E-01 1.783 0.07682 0.97222E-01 0.29729
MORE –0.37869E-02 0.3815E-01 –0.099 0.92107 7.4965 15.484
LESS –0.16182E-03 0.1382E-02 –0.117 0.90694 2.5556 11.248
RECY 0.28213E-01 0.7872E-02 3.584 0.00047 0.33819 1.2597
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t) –0.239682.
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APPENDIX 2
Random Effects Model: Results
Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)
2 estimates of Var[u] + Q * Var[e]
Based on Means OLS
0.28665E+00 0.29016E+00
(Used Means. Q = 0.3824)
Estimates:
Var[e] = 0.678056E-02
Var[u] = 0.284054E+00
Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] = 0.976686
Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 108.01992
( 1 df, prob value = 0.000000)
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman) = 57.08576 ( 8 df, prob value = 0.000000)
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)–-0.203331
Re-estimated using GLS coefficients:
Estimates:
Var[e] = 0.943176E-02
Var[u] = 0.446442E+00
Sum of Squares 0.522667E+02
R-squared 0.803433E+00
N[0,1] used for significance levels.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Prob|t|òx Mean Std. Dev.
of X of X
LNUNIT 0.90685 0.5931E-01 15.291 0.00000 8.1056 1.1407
LNDENS –0.11500 0.3243E-01 –3.546 0.00039 0.22659E-01 –2.3536
CON 0.44721E-01 0.9293E-01 0.481 0.63035 0.27083 0.44594
WHEEL 0.20935E-01 0.4360E-01 0.480 0.63108 0.32639 0.47053
INTWHL 0.10955 0.3708E-01 2.954 0.00314 0.97222E-01 0.29729
LESS –0.16022E-02 0.1319E-02 –1.215 0.22436 2.5556 11.248
MORE 0.89583E-02 0.5101E-02 1.756 0.07906 7.4965 15.484
RECY 0.25980E-01 0.7803E-02 3.329 0.00087 0.33819 1.2597
Constant 4.3373 0.4959 8.746 0.00000
